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THE ICC RE-EXAMINED: A COLLOQUY
I. THE ORGANIZATION OF TRANSPORT REGULATION
In re: Huntington: The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, The Railroads, and the
Public Interest, 61 YALE L. J. 467 (1952), and Williams: Transportation Regulation and
the Department of Commerce, 62 YALE L. J. 563 (1953).
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON:t1"
Mr. Williams' criticisms in Transporta-
tion Regulation are in effect limited to my
recommendation in the Marasmus that the
regulatory functions of the ICC should be
placed within the Department of Com-
merce and should be subject to the general
policy guidance of the Secretary of Com-
merce. He does not defend the existence
of the ICC as such; he does not question
the desirability of transferring the ICC's
executive functions to the Department of
Commerce; nor does he raise issue with
the idea of dividing regulatory functions
among three separate commissions.
On the general issue of whether or not
transportation regulation should be placed
within an executive agency, Mr. Williams
argues that "rate-making and regulation
are legislative in character." In the first
place, there is nothing in law or fact which
makes these activities more "legislative"
than any other activities performed by the
Government. Regulation is "legislative"
only in the sense that the performance of
regulatory activities by the Government
derives its justification from Article I of
the Constitution and can only be undertak-
en by virtue of an act of Congress. But ex-
cept for those few functions of Govern-
ment which can be traced directly to consti-
tutional grants of power to the president,
this is true of all activities of the Federal
Government. The communication activi-
ties of the Post Office are just as much
"legislative" in character as the regulatory
activities of the ICC, and, as Mr. Williams
notes, Congress has frequently delegated
regulatory functions to executive branch
agencies. Nor can the more specific func-
tion of rate-making be considered primarily
"legislative." For rate-making is a form
of price control and price control functions
have normally been exercised by the execu-
tive branch. This is true of over-all emerg-
ency price controls and the more specialized
price controls such as those exercised by
the Secretary of Agriculture.
Mr. Williams also argues that it vio-
lates the theory of the separation of powers
for Congress to make unnecessary dele-
gations of power to the executive. The
assumption behind this is that if Congress
does not delegate this power to the execu-
tive branch it will retain this power itself.
The idea is that Congress gives away
something when it assigns a function to
an executive agency which it does not give
away when it assigns this function to some
other kind of agency. This theory is fal-
lacious because it assumes that what does
not belong to the executive branch must
belong to the legislative branch. Actually
Congress has no more effective means of
exercising control over independent com-
missions than it has for exercising control
over executive agencies. The techniques of
congressional influence--statutory defini-
tion of policy and organization, investiga-
tions, appropriations, senatorial approval
of appointments--are the same in each case.
Executive control over independent com-
missions is much weaker of course than
over executive agencies, but this does not
mean that congressional control is thereby
strengthened. Instead it merely means that
the total political control over these agen-
cies is that much less, and it was for this
reason that the President's Committee on
Administrative Management described in-
dependent commissions, in 1937, as a "head-
less 'fourth branch' of the Government, a
haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies
and uncoordinated powers."
The theory of the independent commis-
sion also suffers from certain internal con-
tradictions. On the one hand, the claim is
frequently made, as Mr. Williams did, that
their functions are primarily "legislative"
in character. On the other hand, in order
to justify freedom from executive control,
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it is also frequently argued, as by the chair-
man of the ICC in 1937, that these agencies
are not "policy-making" agencies. Quite
obviously the commissions cannot be one
and not the other. The legislative function
is the policy-maling function. If the com-
missions are legislating, then they are also
policy-making, and should be subject to
effective control by the politically re-
sponsible branches of the Government. If
they are not policy-making, then they are
not legislating, and the claim that their
functions are peculiarly "legislative" in
character must fall by the wayside.
Mr. Williams also argues that whereas
cabinet secretaries do not mind being over-
ruled by the ICC it would be "distinctly un-
pleasant" for them to be overruled by an-
other cabinet officer. However, every
cabinet officer frequently undergoes the
experience of having another cabinet officer
veto a proposal of his when the major
responsibility for the policy concerned lies
with the opposing official. Furthermore,
since all the departmental heads would be
part of the same official family there is a
much greater likelihood of more effective
coordination of transportation regulation
with the activities of the other departments.
The final argument of Mr. Williams
with respect to the general issue of putting
regulation in the executive branch is that
the growth of executive power tends to
lead to totalitarianism. The real danger of
totalitarianism, however, stems not from
executive power but instead from irre-
sponsible power whether it is wielded by
a chief executive, an independent commis-
sion, or the legislature. In fact, a strong,
responsible executive is the best possible
insurance against the development of totali-
tarianism. Where totalitarian parties have
come into power, they have done so largely
as a result of the chaos and indecisiveness
caused by a lack of positive leadership. A
system of legislative supremacy is much
more likely to produce this sort of chaos
than a system which permits strong, re-
sponsible executive leadership. Hitler came
to power not because the Reichstag dele-
gated powers to Chancellor Brilning but
rather because, prior to that time, the
Reichstag had been unable to deal effective-
ly with the problems confronting Germany.
The United States and Great Britain are
fortunate in that they both have vigorous
executive institutions. Totalitarianism is
a much greater danger in France with its
system of chaotic legislative government
than it is in these two countries with their
strong, responsible executives.
The problem which constantly comes up
in any analysis of regulation is how to
achieve political control in the good cense
without achieving it in the bad sense. In a
democracy, general policies should Le de-
cided by the citizen body, by elected officials
directly responsible to the citizen body or
a portion thereof, or by appointed officials
directly responsible to elected officials. On
the other hand, in the determination of
specific cases with a limited number of
parties-in-interest, it is desirable to mini-
mize political control so as to prevent the
democratic process from Yiecoming per-
verted as an instrument of improper in-
fluence. The dilemma then is how to
achieve democratic control of general
policy and yet also prevent improper
"political influence" in specific cases. It
would b- easy to name various agencies in
the executive branch whose general policies
have been responsible and democratic but
whose specific actions have been improper-
ly influenced either by congressmen or
presidential cronies. In contrast, the ICC
is a good example of an agency where the
value of democratic control has been saEri-
ficed to prevent improper influence. As a
result, the Commission's general policies
have irresponsibly benefitted one particular
interest group, but there has never ben
anything remotely resembling improper
influence or scandal about the decision ot
specific cases.
The best way out of this dilemma is,
I believe, to the put the regulatory commis-
sions within an executive department and
give the head of that department general
policy control over the commissions. At the
same time, the departmental head should
not have the power tv fire members of a
commission nor should lie have the power
to dictate the results of specific prozced-
ings. The head of the department should
be able to issue general policy direc-
tives, particularly where the commissions
develop contradictory policies. Each com-
mission should decide its cases on their
merits in accordance with these directives.
This balance between commission and
departmental secretary is a difficult one to
maintain, but there is no reason vhy it
should be an impossible one.
Mr. Williams argues that the proposals
of the original article, by giving the Secre-
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tary of Commerce some authority over
transportation regulation, would cause
drastic changes in regulatory policy each
time a new secretary came in. This hardly
seems likely. Every cabinet officer is to a
large degree bound by the general policies
established by his predecessors. He can
modify then, to be sure, but he can only
modify them within limits. Precedent, the
pressure for continuity, and the dependence
of the secretary on civil servants for ad-
vice and guidance are powerful factors
militating against drastic change. It would
seem that this suggested division of labor
between semi-permanent commissions and
the politically-appointed secretaries would
offer an excellent means of balancing con-
tinuity of policy against flexibility and the
necessity of alteration of policy to meet
changing needs.
C, DICKERMAN WILLIAMS:t
Transportation regulation is not a
proper function of the Department of
Commerce nor of the executive branch of
the Government. Apparently I did not
make clear my opinion that the ICC should
not be abolished and that its regulatory
functions should not be divided among
three separate commissions. That conclu-
sion seemed implicit in my opposition both
to the transfer of its regulatory functions
to the Department of Commerce and to the
creation of the super-commission which
would be necessary to resolve conflicts be-
tween any three separate commissions such
as envisaged by Prof. Huntington. Prof.
Huntington's argument seems to come
down to the proposition that the transfer
to the executive branch will eliminate the
ICC's need for political support from the
railroads. He seems overly optimistic in
thinking that the Department will not
develop sympathy for railroad problems
to the extent the ICC has. Since the
Department's promotional responsibilities
in the fields of aviation and shipping
tend to give it a sympathetic approach
towards carrier problems, it might find
a similar responsibility towards the rail-
roads which, according to the Supreme
Court [263 U.S. 456, 478 (1924)] are
presently under the "fostering guardian-
ship" of the ICC, whose successor the De-
partment would by hypothesis have become.
Moreover, the Department's close asso-
ciation with business interests provides a
conservative atmosphere which is dispelled
only when the incumbent secretary is an
aggressive liberal, an infrequent event.
The Washington Post [May 18, 1953.
p. 5, cols. 1-2] has reported that the
present Secretary of Commerce favored,
and the ICC opposed, a bill to expedite
action on general rate increases sought
by the railroads. Applying Prof. Hunt-
ington's theory that bureaucratic atti-
tudes are determined by political support,
this report would indicate that the Depart-
ment is now more dependent than the ICC
on the railroads.
It is true that with the Government as
complex as it is today, and with so many
important matters demanding the attention
of both the president and Congress, the
direct access to the president that is pro-
vided by location in a cabinet level depart-
ment can be enormously valuable to any
agency. In this sense Prof. Huntington is
correct that regulation by an executive de-
partment would tend to lessen the need for
political support from the railroads or any
other interest. A better solution is greater
consciousness on the part of Congress,
especially through the Commerce and Ap-
propriation Committees, of its guardian-
ship of the ICC. Unless there is, some sud-
den whirlwind may blow up, and when it
has died down the ICC may be in the De-
partment of Commerce or another execu-
tive department.
Prof. Huntington provides no illustra-
tions for his statement that cabinet officers
frequently overrule each other. All I can
say is that when I was in the Government
it happened very rarely and, when it did,
the results were painful.
Prof. Huntington has somewhat elabo-
rated his proposal that his three commis-
sions be subject to the policy guidance of
the Secretary. If the Secretary of Com-
merce can issue policy directives, on the
basis of which the commissions must decide
specific cases, he becomes the final admini-
strative authority in regulation. Even if he
does not decide specific cases, he can con-
tMember, New York Bar; formerly General Counsel, United States Department ot Commerce.
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trol their decision-which amounts to the
same thing. This would be particularly
true under Prof. Huntington's plan which
charges the Secretary with the duty of
reconciling conflicts between his three com-
missions.
Prof. Huntington asserts that the policy
of a governmental department does not
change drastically with the appearance of
a new secretary. For that reason he dis-
counts my argument that the numerous
changes in both the personnel and the eco-
nomic philosophy in the office of the Secre-
tary of Commerce would cause an unde-
sirable lack of continuity in transporta-
tion regulation. Prof. Huntington would
hardly make this assertion if he had been
living in Washington in the last few
months. There were sharp changes in
policy and policy-making personnel at the
Commerce Department even when new
secretaries were appointed during the ad-
ministrations of Presidents Roosevelt and
Truman, although the new appointments
were in no way connected with any change
in the national administration. Depart-
ment reorganizations by Secretary Wallace
were particularly drastic. This is all as it
should be--within the executive branch.
It would be most inappropriate in a regula-
tory body.
Prof. Huntington makes another re-
markable argument when he states that
rate-making and other transportation regu-
lation is not legislative in character but is
rather executive action authorized by Con-
gress. I commend to his attention Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan [293 U.S. 3,S
(1935) ], the most detailed exposition in re-
cent times of the theory of the delegation
of the legislative power confided to Con-
gress by Article I of the Constitution. In
this opinion the Court [p. 427] expressly
mentions "the authority of the ICC" as
resting "upon this principle" of the delega-
tion of legislative power. The authority for
executive action comes, on the other hand,
from Article II of the Constitution. In the
Panama Refining case, Section 9 of the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act and the
action of the President thereunder were
held unconstitutional because that action,
legislative in character, had been author-
ized by Congress without standards and
limits essential to valid delegation.
It is of course true that legislative power
is often, if not usually, delegated to officers
of the executive branch, as in the case of
emergency price controls to which Prof.
Huntington refers. But the Federal Power
Commission, the National Labor Relations
Board and the Federal Communications
Commission are analogous to the ICC, and
if price controls become permanent, an in-
dependent agency presumably would be
created. In my opinion, the world's e.xperi-
ence in recent decades in the absorption of
power by the executive decisively teaches
that such delegations should be to inde-
pendent agencies unless strict necessity
otherwise requires. As Mr. Justice Frank-
furter said in his concurring opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. . Saw'er
[343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) ] :
"For them [the draftsmen of the
Constitution] the doctrine of sep-
aration of powers was not mere
theory; it was felt necessity. Not
so long ago it was fashionable to
find our systen of checks and bal-
ances obstructive to effective gv-
ernnent. It was easy to ridicule
that system as outmoded-tuo
easy. The experience through
w hich the world has passed in our
own day has made vivid the reali-
zation that the Framers of our
Constitution were not inexperi-
enced doctrinaires."
Under Article II of the Constitution it
is the duty of the president to "recom-
mend' to Congress "such Measures as he
shall deen necessary and expedient." It is
consistent with and implements this pro-
vision for the Secretary of Commerce, as
the officer of the executive branch charged
with "over-all policy" in transportation, to
present such relevant views or evidence as
he may have to Congress or its delegates,
the regulatory agencies. The mere presen-
tation of those views, if at all cogent, exerts
a certain pressure in favor of their adop-
tion partly because of their persuasiveness
and partly because of the prestige inherent
in any presentation by the executive branch.
I see no objection to pressure so defined
and limited. I oppose such pressure as ex-
ists or might exist by virtue of policy direc-
tives or influence over salaries, appropria-
tions, and subordinate personnel. For this
reason, and on grounds more fully stated in
my previous article, I am against Prof.
Huntington's proposal for the transfer of
rail, water, and highway regulation to the
Department of Commerce.
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II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE ICC WITH THE RAILROADS
In re: Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the
Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952), and Morgan, A Critique of "The Marasmus of the
ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest," 62 YALE L.J. 171 (1953).
Dr. Morgan's Critique answered the propositions set forth in Professor Huntington's
Marasmus. For the convenience of our readers, Professor Huntington's replies to the
Critique and Dr. Morgan's rejoinders appear side by side under each of the original propo-
sition headings-Professor Huntington's in the left-hand column and Dr. Morgan's in the
right-hand column of each page. (Eds.)
MAJOR PRoposiTIoN A. Since the 1920's the ICC has been closely affiliated with the rail-
roads and has usually tended to act favorably towards the interests of the railroads in situa-
tions where those interests conflict with the interests of other groups.
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON:
This major proposition and its sub-
propositions were concerned with the im-
pact of ICC action on the interests sur-
rounding the Commission. They were not
concerned with the economic or social wis-
dom or unwisdom of these actions. Yet
Dr. Morgan seemed to assume that be-
cause it was argued that ICC policy has
tended to favor the railroads that conse-
quently this policy was being condemned
as "wrong," "erroneous," or "nefarious."
He mistook a descriptive proposition con-
cerned with the impact of ICC policy for
a normative proposition concerned with the
desirability of that policy. He attempted to
prove that the actions of the Commission
are economically sound, legally justified, or
in the public interest. He did not disprove
the propositions advanced in the original
article. There could, indeed, be little better
proof of these propositions than Dr. Mor-
gan's efforts to explain and defend the un-
deniable facts which support them. To
analyze ICC policy as Dr. Morgan pro-
poses would require hundreds of pages.
CHARLES S. M1ORGAN:t
Prof. Huntington would reject as ir-
relevant any discussion concerned with the
economic or social wisdom of Commission
actions. He seems to state that it is possible
to describe the impact of a Commission
action without knowing the reasons for the
action. Only by knowing the action, how-
ever, can the reaction be grasped. The
Critique answered the question whether, in
fact, the railroads were "favored" and
some other interest was "alienated." Thus,
denial of an increase in rail rates needed
to afford adequate service would not bene-
fit the public. Finding where the "ad-
vantage" lies in a decision or policy requires
far more than a superficial treatment of a
kind which tends to put every rate increase
down as a "favor" to the railroads and a
"disfavor" to shippers. Realism is sacri-
ficed in thus setting up an antithesis of
interests. While Prof. Huntington him-
self may not condemn alleged "favoritism"
of the railroads, he laid the basis in
Marasmus for reader condemnation of the
Commission.
SUBPROPOSITION Al. The railroads generally praise and support the Commission and its
work.
PROF. HUNTINGTON:
The evidence relevant to this proposi-
tion in the Maranus consisted of a care-
ful survey of railroad opinion as revealed
DR. MORGAN:
Prof. Huntington grants that railroad
criticism of the time used in reaching rate-
level decisions is relevant, as is railroad
tChief carrier research analyst, Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics, Interstate Commerce
Commission. The views expressed are offered in a personal capacity and solely on the responsibility of
the writer.
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PROF. HuvN"T-GTox:
in the testimony of railroad officials before
congressional committees, editorials in
trade publications such as Railway Age,
public statements by railroad officials, pub-
lications of the Association of American
Railroads, and other miscellaneous sources
including appraisals of railroad attitudes
such as that made by the Hoover Commis-
sion staff. These sources indicated that in
the past fifteen to twenty years the rail-
roads have been highly satisfied with the
Commission and have generally praised its
worth. The expressions of praise and satis-
faction were found to be far stronger
and far more numerous than the occasional
railroad criticisms of the Commission. Dr.
Morgan did not reject this evidence of rail-
road support for the Commission. Instead
in his brief passage dealing xwith railroad
attitudes, he selected from the original
article that evidence which was presented
to show the nature and extent of rail-
road opposition to the Commission and re-
produced this in his Critique as if it were
the entire story.
In this section Dr. Morgan also listed a
few specific issues with respect to which
the railroads have recently criticized the
Commission. Now, nobody will argue that
the railroads and the Commission agree
100 percent of the time. That is not the
issue. The issue is whether or not they
generally praise, support, and defend the
Commission. In the face of the overwhelm-
ing evidence presented in the original
article, Dr. Morgan cannot disprove this
proposition by citing a few exceptional cir-
cunstances in which the railroads have op-
posed the Commission.
Dr. Mo.oA:N:
opposition to the Commission's restrictive
policy on rail-motor operation. On the
other hand, he overlooks what was set out
in Critique on these additional poiats: (a)
railroad Qfforts to correct by legislation
alleged Commission favoritism to motor
carriers in the granting of op-.rating
rights; (b I railroad opposition to the class
rate decision; (c) railroad disaploirtnent
in decision,. which involved rail and m.tor
or water rates; (d) railroad inability to
budge the Commission very far frem its
p o I i c y o f denying volume-minimum
("trainload") rates; (e) railroad opposi-
tion to severe reductions of capitalization
in reorganization proceedings, and objec-
tions to decisions on variou; unification ap-
plicatiwns; (f ) railroad op piti in to cer-
tain financial requirements; and (g) the
Commissi',n'% rcjvction of the railroads'
proposal that it be authlurized to r'as; on
public transl ortation projtets ard a..s
usvr chargeb. This list is very far from
cvmkIcte, but the subjects mentioa: d go to
the very core of railrvad operations. An
evaluation sf all phases of the subject, baed
on an understanding of the issues involved,
kaves no question that the list of differ-
ences betwe-cen the railroads and the Com-
nii sivn, while different in kind, iL at least
as great as a list that might b,. compiled of
isuvs which other carriers w'ould like the
Commission to have handld difierently.
Where, in the light of the foregoing, is the
"affiliation" Prof. Huntingon alleges?
What has become of the "fev," exceptions?
Su3paoPosiToN A2. The railroads have generally defended the independence of the
Commission against attempts to subject it to the influetae or control of other goz'eriunnt
agencies.
PROF. HUNTINGTON:
The Marasmus showed that the rail-
roads have consistently defended the inde-
pendence of the ICC by (1) resisting at-
tempts to subject it to executive control,
(2) opposing the creation of new agencies
which might rival the Commission, and (3)
opposing the interference of existing agen-
cies with the Commission.
Dr. Morgan's first argument -'as
limited to defending and justifying the
DR. MORGAN:
Prof. Huntington attempts to w rite
down the importance of the support of the
Commission's independence by other car-
riers, shippers, and members of Congress.
The reader must judge this weighing of the
evidence. It should not be difficult to un-
derstand that the railroads, in opposing
attempts which would lessen the inde-
pendence of the Commission, were attend-
ing to their own interests in these matters
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PROF. HUNTINGTON:
actions of the railroads in defense of Com-
mission independence. For instance, he
stated that the opposition of the railroads
to the appearance of federal departments
before the Commission is a "natural atti-
tude." He thus admits that the railroads
do so defend the Commission which was, of
course, the only point made in the original
article. And, in any event, given the gen-
eral affiliation between the railroads and
the Commission, this author would be the
last person in the world to deny that rail-
roads' attitude was not a "natural" one.
In this same discussion, Dr. Morgan
demonstrated again his inability to dis-
tinguish between factual and normative
statements. He quoted, for instance, a
sentence from the Marasius, and added
appropriate emphasis: "Attempts by ex-
isting agencies to influence or dictate
ICC policy through intervention in pro-
ceedings before the Commission, in-
formal pressure upon commissioners, or
by other means, have been severely at-
tacked by the railroads." He then com-
mented: "It suffices here to italicize lan-
guage which appears to recognize neither
statutory duties nor ethics in interagency
relations." The implication of course is
that the statement in the Marasmus was a
defense of the activities of these other agen-
cies rather than a factual description of the
interaction of pressure groups about the
Commission. Unable to deny the fact that
the railroads have regularly defended the
Commission against other agencies, Dr.
Morgan attempted to discover moral judg-
ments where none exist.
Dr. Morgan's second point was that
interest groups other than the railroads
have -at times defended the independence
of the ICC. This is perfectly true: occa-
sionally other groups have come to the
aid of the Commission. The attitudes of
these other groups have fluctuated, how-
ever, and they have at times been with the
Commission and at times opposed to the
Commission. The railroads have been
alone, on the other hand, in their consist-
ent defense of the ICC. No other group
has been as active, voluble, or effective
in this respect. The support of these other
groups has been incidental to that of the
railroads, and the fact that this incidental
support has existed in no way diminishes
the close and continuing affiliation between
the railroads and the Commission.
DR- MORGAN:
and were concerned only incidentally with
the Commission as such. The beginning,
at least, of a complete breakdown of ad-
ministrative regulation in the transporta-
tion field was involved in some of these
proposals. An issue of vital importance
to the future of rail and other interests was
at stake.
Prof. Huntington again fails to distin-
guish between what is primary and what
is incidental when he states that railroad
opposition to the appearance of other de-
partments before the Commission is a "de-
fense" of the Commission. Railroad oppo-
sition stems entirely from efforts to protect
railroad interests. As a matter of fact,
motor carriers resent the appearance of
Government departments at hearings on
their applications to increase rates,
The same fallacy is found in Prof.
Huntington's mention of railroad opposi-
tion to "dictation" of ICC policy by other
agencies. It is questionable whether the
practices mentioned actually occur. Efforts
on the part of anyone to go "around the
record" by discussion of pending decisions
with commissioners would be comparable
to trying to influence the decisions of
judges. Persons who represent private in-
terests before the Commission realize the
question of ethics involved, and it is reason-
able to assume that attorneys for other
Government agencies are equally respect-
ful of the proprieties.
[Vol. 63: 44
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StIPRoPosiTioN A3. The railroads have consistently supported the expansion of the
power of the ICC.
PROF. HUNTINGTON:
The evidence from railroad state-
ments and publications supporting this
proposition is clear and incontrovertible,
and Dr. Morgan did not attempt to gainsay
it. Instead he made five other arguments
which may be summarized as follows:
(1) ICC regulation of motor and
water carriers was required by "economic
realities" and "stark economic fact."
Dr. Morgan's statement may or may
not be true, but its truth or falsity does
not have any relation to the truth or falsity
of the point at issue.
(2) Railroad support for the expan-
sion of ICC power was an effort to "get
simple justice."
The significant fact is not whether the
railroad cause was just or unjust but that
the railroads thought they could best secure
their ends by expanding the power of the
Commission.
(3) Other groups in addition to the
railroads and the Commission advocated
the expansion of ICC power over the motor
and water carriers.
Dr. Morgan, however, also admitted
that the railroads were the principal force
working for this legislation. The activities
of other groups were distinctly incidental.
(4) The motor carrier industry is
better off now than it was eighteen years
ago when it was brought under ICC regu-
lation.
Again the argument has no relevance to
the proposition that railroads have sup-
ported the expansion of ICC power.
(5) The ICC has not supported the
attempts by the railroads to expand its
jurisdiction over the airlines.
This is perfectly true. It is also irrele-
vant to an argument dealing with the atti-
tudes and actions of the railroads towards
the ICC.
DR. MORGAN:
There was no questioning in Critique of
the fact that the railroads have supported
expansion of the Commission's functions
in various ways. Prof. Huntington again,
however, finds indication of an interest in
the Commission as such, whereas it should
be obvious that the railroads' compelling
desire was to secure more comprehensive
and necessarily unified regulation. The
effort to show an "affiliation" therefore
fails. As any support for regulation by
non-railroad interests necessarily weakens
his argument, Prof. Huntington bdittles
the amount of support from these sources.
SuBP.orosiroN A4. The ICC has generally favored the railroads in conflicts between
their interests and those of other groups with respect to the general level of rates and fares.
PROF. HUNTINGTON:
The Marasnus pointed out that there
had been a marked shift in the attitude of
the ICC in favor of railroad requests for
DR. MORGAN:
A more accurate statement of what
took place will dispel the illusion of "affili-
ation" that Prof. Huntington tries to
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PROF. HUNTINGTON:
general rate advances during the 1920's.
This point was substantiated by comparing
the relationship between freight rates and
wholesale prices during each of these
periods. The principal cases in which the
Commission has dealt with passenger fares,
express rates, commutation fares, and other
special types of charges were likewise cited
as evidence of the Commission's generally
favorable attitude towards railroad de-
mands. It was also pointed out that the
Commission had alienated from it, as a re-
sult of its actions, various shipper interests,
and numerous state and local interests.
Dr. Morgan did not in substance deny
the conflict which Commission action has
caused between the Commission and the
other interests mentioned above; he merely
attempted to defend the Commission view-
point. Other arguments in this category
related to the economic wisdom and general
desirability of Commission action in ap-
proving railroad requests. Typical of these
is his statement with respect to the 1920
general rate advance:
"It is not true that the 1920 in-
crease favored the railroads.
Earnings in this period helped
railroads to acquire credit which
permitted a large modernization
program beginning in 1923. The
country profited greatly from this
program."
Obviously every decision of the Commis-
sion should benefit the country. The issue
is not whether the Commission acted in the
"public interest" but rather how it inter-
preted the public interest in choosing
among the competing interests which ap-
pear before it. The argument of the Maras-
mus was that the Commission has inter-
preted "public interest" to mean "railroad
interest."
Another argument in the Critique was
that the Commission has passed along to
the motor and water carriers the general
rate increases granted the railroads. As
Dr. Morgan himself recognized, however,
the initiative in all these increases has
come from the railroads and the Commis-
sion has approved these "across the board"
rises because it felt them necessary to meet
railroad needs. In fact, the Commission
has rendered the incidental benefits to the
other carriers somewhat nugatory by per-
DR. MORGAN:
create. In 1920, as was generally antici-
pated in view of the worn-out condition
of rail facilities and the emphasis which
the Transportation Act of 1920 placed on
adequacy of railroad earnings, there was
a substantial increase in the freight rate
level. In 1922 the Commission ordered a
10 percent reduction; in 1926 it denied an
application for a general increase in west-
ern district rates. Beginning in the mid-
twenties, the Commission earnestly en-
deavored to give agriculture rate relief,
but the Supreme Court in large part nega-
tived its efforts to do so. In 1931, though
the railroad credit position was extremely
poor, the Commission temporarily granted
a comparatively small part of an ap-
plication for increased rates. In 1933 it
denied reductions requested by shippers.
In 1935 it permitted certain moderate.
emergency increases and in 1936 allowed
certain of them to stay in, though others
were removed. -igher costs led to a 10
percent increase in 1938 (5 percent in the
case of agricultural commodities) and to
an increase in 1942, though the latter in-
crease was removed over railroad opposi-
tion when a war volume of traffic no longer
made it necessary. Inflation after the war
ran costs up; freight and passenger rate in-
creases followed. This record certainly
affords no basis for Prof. Huntington's
statement that there was a "generally fav-
orable attitude" toward the railroads' de-
mands.
Another statement in the Critique was
to the effect that railroad costs and not
wholesale prices require consideration in
fixing rate levels, that tying rates to prices
would defeat shippers' interest in rate sta-
bility, that, other tests of reasonableness
being met, the Commission must allow car-
riers to earn, if possible, a fair rate of
return, and that the rates of return have
averaged less than a fair return on a
reasonable rate base. The relevancy of
this argument arises from the fact that
shippers do not expect railroads (or other
carriers) to operate at an unreasonably
low level of earnings; aside from their
basic fairness, they realize their own needs
for adequate facilities and service. The
latest general increase in rail rates, less
than requested, carried an expiration date.
A petition to have it made permanent was
recently denied.
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PROF. HrVNrXGToN :
mitting the railroads to exempt from the
full increases those commodities for which
there is sharp competition with the -water
and motor carriers.
Dr. Morgan made one point which has
some elements of validity to it. This is his
reference to the conflict between the Com-
mission and the railroads over various
legislative proposals designed to permit
the railroads to put into effect general
rate increases upon thirty days' notice to
the Commission. This is part of the dis-
satisfaction which the railroads have mani-
fested in recent years with Commission
delay in approving increases. It should be
pointed out, however, that the Commission
in the most recent general rate advance
case, Ex Parfe 175, granted "the railroads
practically all that they asked for," [132
Railway Age 37, Apr. 28, 1952] and is
making various attempts within the limits
of its decreased viability to be quicker in
meeting railroad demands.
The final and most lengthy criticism
which Dr. Morgan made in his discussion
of this subproposition related to the index
of freight rates used in the comparison
between the levels of freight rates and
wholesale prices. Dr. Morgan's charge
against this index was that it reflects not
only changes in the level of rates but also
changes in the composition of traffic. This
criticism is quite valid. But the index used
in the Marasmus has the advantage over
others in that it has been adjusted for
changes in the length of haul. For the
years it covers, this index is far and
away the best available indication of the
level of freight rates. In fact, it is the only
such index which is reasonably accurate.
While changes in the composition of traffic
undoubtedly throw it off to a certain ex-
tent, they do not invalidate it as a test of
the validity of the proposition that the
Commission tended to act unfavorably
toxward the interests of the railroads before
1920 and favorably toward those interests
since 1924). Only in 1947 did the Commis-
sion develop a better index, and this shows
that between 1947 and 1950 railroad rates
went up 25 percent whereas wholesale
prices increased only 18.6 percent.
DPi Mo. %AN:
The Critique further stated that water
and motor carriers have derived great bene-
fit from "following the rails up" after gen-
eral increases in rail rates. Prof. Hunting-
ton states in reply that the railroads initia-
ted the increases, and that the "across-the-
board" increases were made because they
were considered necessary to meet railroad
needs. The increases, however, involved
the same considerations as, and were no
different in purpose from, the advances
given the railroads. Water carriers could
scarcely have exerted the initiative, since
rail rates generally constitute a ceiling on
vater rates, and, under its statutory
authority, the Commission could not have
required shippers to pay higher rail charges
to protect water carriers. Motor carriers.
not parties to the rail proccedings, had to
justify proposed increases in regular
course; advances in rail rates laid a basis
for more increases, but the fact that rail
rates went up did not of itself entitle motor
carriers to like increases.
Prof. Huntington now admits as "quite
valid" the criticism as to the effect on the
freight rate index of variations in types of
traffic, but still thinks the chart is properly
adjusted for changes in length of haul. He
claims the index "is far and away the
best available indication of the level of
freight rates." "In fact," he adds, "it is the
only such index which is reasonably accu-
rate." As no one else has attempted a
comprehensive index covering such a span
of years, the comparison is without point.
The index was definitely discredited when
offered by a witness in a Commission pro-
ceeding.
19531
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
SuBPRoposIIoN AS. The ICC has generally favored the railroads in conflicts betwecto
their interests and those of other groups in the area of monopoly and antitrust.
PROF. HUNTINGTON:
The Marasmus pointed out that the
Commission endorsed the railroads' use of
collective price-fixing arrangements, and
that it failed to cooperate with the Depart-
ment of Justice in Sherman Act prosecu-
tions.
Dr. Morgan attempted to show that
there was no significant change in ICC
policy in the area of monopoly and anti-
trust before and after 1920. It was pointed
out in the Marasnus, however, that the
Commission did not receive significant
powers with respect to competition until
the Transportation Act of 1920, and that
consequently it "only rarely" acted in this
area before that date. Hence it is rather
difficult to discern the significance or
relevance of Dr. Morgan's arguments on
this point.
Dr. Morgan pointed out that the Com-
mission-sponsored Reed-Bulwinkle Act,
which was designed to exempt railroad
rate bureaus from the antitrust laws, was
supported by some non-railroad groups,
and that it exempted water and motor car-
rier bureaus as well as railroad ones. The
entire controversy over this bill, however,
concerned the railroads' bureaus which had
been under attack by the Department of
Justice. The railroads stood to gain the
most from the bill (since it would block
antitrust prosecutions directed at them);
they were the strongest force pushing for
the bill; and they were aided with the full
support of the Commission. Obviously any
bill exempting railroad rate bureaus would
also have to exempt those of other carriers
subject to Commission regulation. Ob-
viously also, since the interests opposed to
this legislation were also very strong (it
was passed over a Presidential veto), it
was sound political strategy for the ICC-
railroad bloc to get as much support as
possible. That other groups received inci-
dental benefits as a by-product of this
legislation cannot obscure the facts that it
was designed primarily to help the rail-
roads and that the Commission was its
active sponsor.
Dr. Morgan also argued that since the
passage of the Reed-Bulwinkle Bill the
Commission has not followed a "lenient"
policy in its interpretation of that Act.
Nonetheless, all the major agreements
filed with the Commission under the act
have been approved and this has frequently
occurred over the opposition of the Depart-
ment of Justice.
DR. MORGAN:
The Critiques general answer to this
proposition was that the Commission, ob-
serving its governing statutes, has applied
the will of Congress to particular situa-
tions. Prof. Huntington makes no allow-
ance whatever for statutory duty; it suf-
fices for him if he can find some interest
which dislikes a given line of decisions,
If, however, the Commission followed the
views of another agency when it considered
these views inconsistent with its own
statutes, its viability in Congress, in the
courts, and elsewhere would fall to zero
in record time. The Commission's "tough"
but intelligent and informed policy of main-
taining competition where it is in the pub-
lic interest is well understood.
Prof. Huntington, forced to concede
that shippers were almost unanimously in
favor of the 1948 rate-bureau legislation
and that other carriers supported this leg-
islation, turns to, the argument that the
railroads stood to gain most and that the
other agencies therefore received only "in-
cidental benefits as a by-product of this
legislation." Since certain motor carrier
bureaus were under attack at the time, and
as motor and water carriers subsequently
filed a substantial number of agreements,
the interest of these carriers in the rate-
bureau legislation was far from merely
"incidental." Moreover, railroad and Com-
mission views on aspects of this legislation
diverged.
Prof. Huntington further asserts that
"all the major agreements filed with the
Commission under the Act have been
approved." The facts show how erroneous
this statement is. As of early June 1953,
44 applications had been filed under Sec-
tion 5a, of which 15 were pending for de-
cision. Of the 29 decided cases, only 6 (4
rail and 2 motor carrier) were approved
as submitted. Six others were dismissed,
of which one was reopened and denied and
another was approved after amendment of
the agreement. One was denied and there
has been no further action. Sixteen (5 rail-
road, 3 water carrier, and 8 motor carrier)
were approved subject to conditions.
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SuBpRoposmox A6. The ICC has generally favored the railroads in conflicts of inicrest
between the railroads and the motor carriers.
PROF. HUNTINGTON:
With respect to the burden of proof
required for rate reductions, Dr. Morgan
apparently misunderstood the argument of
the Marasnus and in addition misinter-
preted the facts of the situation. The Inter-
state Commerce Act as it stood in 1935 re-
quired railroads to sustain the burden of
proof for rate increases by showing that
they were reasonable, non-prejudicial, and
otherwise lawvf ul. There was no comparable
requirement with respect to rate reductions
and the courts had held that such justifica-
tion was not necessary for decreases. The
Motor Carrier Act [1935] was silent as to
the burden of proof on motor carriers for
both increases and decreases. The ICC
nevertheless held that motor carriers had
to sustain the burden of proof for de-
creased rates but need not do so for in-
creased rates. In 1938 Congress amended
the law to require motor carrier justifica-
tion for increased rates in exactly the same
manner as that required of the railroads.
Despite the fact that courts had previously
held that this language meant that the bur-
den of proof did not have to be sustained
for decreases, the Commission from 1938
through 1940 still required the motor car-
riers to carry this burden even though the
railroads with exactly the same statutory
language did not have to do so.
On the issue of railroad penetration in-
to motor carrier freight operations the
Critique attempted first to justify ICC
policy and then to minimize the extent to
which this policy has actually permitted
railroads to acquire motor carrier operat-
ing rights. During the first ten years after
the passage of the Motor Carrier Act,
however, the railroads consistently pressed
for entrance into the motor carrier field.
By 1944, 83 out of 131 Class I railroads re-
ported motor operations of one sort or
another. The ICC commented upon the
large number of railroad cases coming be-
fore it and observed that railroad acquisi-
tions of "hitherto independent motor car-
riers have continued in substantial num-
ber." The Commission went on to say
that, in addition to this "continuing pro-
gram of acquisition by purchase," numer-
ous railroads had "filed successive appli-
cations under Section 207 of the Act for
grants directly to them of authority to
initiate new motor carrier operations." The
Commission's cognizance of this trend did
DR. MORGAN:
The Critique's statement on burden oi
proof in rate cases removed errors in the
Maraswus and was itself factually correct.
It wkas stated clearly that the Commission
has disallowed reductions in motor rates
on lack of evidence that the rates would L2
compensatory. The law in so many words
did not rquire this action, but the declara-
tion of policy and other provisions of the
Motor Carrier Act [1935], called for steps
to protect the industry from ruinous in-
ternal competition. Also noted there ..as
the fact that railroads, despite the lack of
a specific statutory requirement, long had
produced evidence in justification of rate
reductions. Prof. Huntington in effect is
asserting that motor carriers should have
been permitted to put in any rates they
chose, whatever the effect on other motor
carriers and shippers. Legislation, enacted
xithout opposititn, corrected obvious de-
fects in the law.
Prof. Huntington quotes certain tta-
tistics and statemLnts as evidence that the
motor carriers' cncern for tile preserva-
tion of independent trucking was justified.
Making a selective use of a Commission
staff report, he gives an e.-aggerated idea
of rail participation in motor transporta-
tion. He omitted the most significant fig-
ure in that retort; that all o1Lrations,
measured in vehicle-miles, by ur fir Class
I railroads in 1944 were only 3.9 percent oi
the operations conducted by all Class I in-
tercity motor carriers of property. A re-
cently released study [Bureau of Trans-
port Economics and Statistics, Motor Op-
erations of Railroads, Statement No. 5221,
p. 97] shows a reduction from 3.9 percent
in 1944 to 2.3 percent in 194&. Moreover,
some of the 83 railroads Prof. Huntington
cited as having motor operations in 1944
had only very minor ones.
Prof. Huntington gets into further diffi-
culty by stating that the rate of growth
of rail-controlled motor carrier operations,
1944 to 1946, "generally exceeded that of
the industry as a whole." He confines his
figure for rail operations to "eleven large
carriers" controlled by railroads and com-
pares it with a figure for all Class I car-
riers. However, motor freight carriers
controlled by Class I railroads had a
smaller percentage of total intercity motor
freight revenue in 1951 than in 1948. Their
portion of total operating revenue, tons
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PROF. HUNTINGTON:
not, however, result in any significant
change in its attitude, and by 1947 the ICC
had approved railroad applications in well
over a hundred cases. The rate of growth
of railroad-controlled motor carrier opera-
tions during this period generally exceeded
that of the industry as a whole: From 1941
to 1946 the total operating revenue of all
Class I intercity motor carriers increased
75.8 percent; the operating revenues of
eleven large railroad-controlled motor car-
riers increased 142.3 percent. The rail-
roads, moreover, have frequently praised
this policy permitting them to enter into
motor transportation and have urged the
Civil Aeronautics Board to adopt the same
policy with respect to railroad entrance
into air transportation.
DR. MORGAN:
carried, and vehicle-miles also declined.
Prof. Huntington may have included the
passenger revenue of rail-controlled motor
carriers. If so, he has confused the issue
because independent motor carriers of pas-
sengers, with minor exceptions, have not
questioned rail-controlled bus operations.
SuBPROrOsInoN A7. The ICC has generally favored the railroads in conflicts of interest
between the railroads and the water carriers.
PROF. HUNTINGTON:
One of Dr. Morgan's criticisms related
to Commission policy on rail rates for
traffic which has a prior or subsequent
haul by water. Dr. Morgan here miscon-
strued and misunderstood the nature of the
evidence and the argument presented in the
Marasmus. Initially, before it became de-
pendent primarily upon railroad support,
the Commission held that railroads could
not discriminate against water carriers by
charging higher rates on traffic moved by
those carriers. In the 1930's, however, the
Commission altered this policy and held
that railroads might apply different pro-
portional rates to ex-water and ex-rail
traffic. This new doctrine was subsequent-
ly applied in the Mechling line of cases,
permitting the railroads to discriminate
against ex-barge grain moving by rail out
of Chicago. Eventually Commission action
in these cases was overruled by the Su-
preme Court. [330 U.S. 567 (1947)].
Dr. Morgan correctly pointed out, as
was also noted in the Marasmus, that the
Rail and Barge Joint Rates case of 1948
[270 I.C.C. 591] was in part favorable and
in part hostile to the interests of both rail-
roads and water carriers. The significance
of the case, however, lies in the length of
time which it took the Commission to
come to a decision. The original com-
plaints in this case were filed twenty years
before the case was decided, and the main
complaint thirteen years before the deci-
DR. MORGAN:
The Commission's first decision in the
Mechling cases came before the Supreme
Court and was not set aside. Its second de-
cision was reversed. The Court, whose
membership had changed in the interval,
was divided in both instances, as was the
Commission. The Commission decision
would have given the railroads less than
the adjustment they requested.
Prof. Huntington now attributes to this
writer the thought that the Rail and Barge
Joint Rates decision was in part favorable
to railroads and in part unfavorable to
water carriers. As noted in Critique, the
decision favored water carriers only and
was possible only by stretching the statutes
in their behalf. Only the railroads appealed
to the courts or requested vacation of the
order; water carriers did not file for re-
consideration. The Inland Waterways Cor-
poration got what it asked for but has
never used it. The delay in reaching the
decision, though largely inherent in the
situation as it developed, was unusual, but
the Hoover staff study reflected misin-
formation on the barge lines' attitude. The
principal dissatisfaction with the delay-
uncertainty of the outcome -affected
rail and water carriers alike. In any event,
technological considerations and increased
labor costs have led water carriers to show
less and less and now almost no interest
in traffic of the type principally involved
in joint rates. The practical effect of the
(Vol. 63:44
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PROF. HUNTINGTON:
sion. As the Hoover Commission staff
study noted:
"The long delay was, no doubt,
satisfying to rail carriers while
exceedingly irksome to the barge
lines. It contributed to the charge,
frequently made by water carriers
and occasionally by motor car-
riers, that the Commission is rail-
minded." [Commission on Organ-
ization, Staff Report on the I.C.C.
1-56 (1948)].
Dn. MoRGAN:
delay is therefore exaggerated.
Prof. Huntington acknowledges the
Critique's evidence of recent decisions in
which the Cummission has denied rail ap-
plications fur reductions in rates and others
in which it has approved reductions pro-
posed by water carriers. As he has ad-
anced little cvidcnce of his own, no v. eight
can be given his statement that the ca~E
referred to are only a "few instances."
With respect to post-World War II
Commission action on railroad rate reduc-
tions in competition with water carriers,
Dr. Morgan cites a number of recent cases
-many occuring after publication of the
Marasmnis-in which the Commission has
denied railroad requests for competitive
rate reductions and approved similar water
carrier requests. It cannot be assumed,
however, that these few instances repre-
sent a general change in Commission
policy.
MUAJOR PROPOS:Tiox B. The vialilily of the ICC as an admzinist rat ve aygcny is decinn:g
as the Commission gradually loses its admiistrati'e effectiveness, political suppart, and
public prestige.
PROF. HUNTINGTON:
This proposition assumes that any gov-
ernment agency in order to exist and
prosper must have sources of political sup-
port strong enough to maintain its appro-
priations and statutory authority and to
protect itself against opposing groups with
hostile interests. The Maraswus showed
that the ICC, as a result of its close affilia-
tion with the railroads, had alienated other
potential sources of political support. The
opposition of these other groups plus the
gradual decline of the political strength of
the railroads has consequently caused the
"marasmus" of the Commission.
Dr. Morgan first challenged the validity
of applying this type of analysis to the
ICC. He referred to this technique of
analysis as a "doctrine" and implied that
it is somehow immoral to attempt to de-
scribe the behavior of an agency in these
terms. However, viability analysis as a
technique can be neither moral nor im-
moral; it is ethically neutral. It is one
DR. MORGAN:
If. in this practical world, the Commis-
sion's behavior should b such as will ad-
vance its "viability," the question natur-
ally arises as to what Prof. Huntington
means by an agency's having strong
sources of political support. Ey his reason-
ing, if railroads approve a given action
or policy, effective "viability" is sacrificed;
if other interests approve a certain action,
"viability" is gained. How, then, are these
other interests to be converted from an atti-
tude of "alienation" to one of support of the
Commission? Prof. Huntington presum-
ably proposes that the Commission should
render decisions or adopt policies which do
not "favor" railroads but which will be ac-
ceptable to these other interests. As he
considers the legality or visdom of a Com-
mission action irrelevant, he doubtless
would say that the Commission is simply
in an unfortunate position if it must render
decisions which will lessen its "viability"
with non-railroad interests.
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PROF. HUNTINGTON:
thing to say that agency X must do Y in
order to maintain its political support. It
is quite something else to say that agency
X is justified in doing Y in order to main-
tain that support.
Dr. Morgan was hard put to find evi-
dence that the ICC is not on the skids.
Indeed, he even argued that the Commis-
sion urgently needs to develop a more ef-
fective public relations program and closer
relationships with executive agencies and
the Congress. The fact of the Commis-
sion's marasmus is one point upon which
virtually all groups concerned with the
Commission are agreed. In its last annual
report the Commission itself admitted
that it suffered from:
"[A]n impairment of efficient
administration, a growing inabil-
ity to perform the functions and
duties required by the Interstate
Commerce Act and related acts,
and a weakening of the Commis-
sion's ability to carry out the regu-
latory and judicial authority dele-
gated to it by the Congress." [66
I.C.C. ANN. REP. 144 (1952)].
Commissioner Arpaia has similarly re-
ferred to the "swelling tide of criticism"
of the ICC [Transport Topics, Sept. 22,
1952], and it has been reported that plans
are afoot in the Department of Commerce
to transfer the Commission's executive
functions to the Department. [91 Traffic
World 25-6, Feb. 21, 1953]. The most sig-
nificant evidence of the decline of the Com-
mission, however, comes from the rail-
roads themselves. Railway Age, for in-
stance, stated that:
"Many people have noted, usu-
ally with sympathetic concern, the
troubles which have been afflict-
ing the Interstate Commerce
Commission .... The undeniable
shrinkage of the agency's posi-
tion in public esteem has been
ascribed to numerous and com-
plex causes-but it isn't necessary
to seek a multiplicity of subtle ex-
planations when plain starvation
is as evident as it is here. No
horse is able to do twice the work
on half the feed." [132 Railway
Age 61, June 23, 1952].
DR. MORGAN:
Prof. Huntington's statement that the
Commission must maintain adequate po-
litical support, but that actions to this end
do not imply immorality, leaves one very
perplexed. If the Commission were to
make "viability" a test in rendering deci-
sions, it would have to ignore or purposely
construe the law to achieve that end. How
such an action could not be immoral (aside
from its unlawfulness) is difficult to see.
Prof. Huntington's effort to label his
"viability" test as a "descriptive process"
must be rejected, since it calls for a flouting
of the law, all rules of evidence, and the
Commission's duty. Its connotations are
vicious in nature.
Prof. Huntington's references to lack
of adequate funds indicates a misunder-
standing, and losses of functions should
materialize before they enter the discus-
sion.
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SuaBpRoposmo.1 B1. Non-railroad interest groups affected by Commission action ha,.
become alienated from the Commission.
PROF. HUNTINGTON:
Only the motor carriers can express
that industry's view on the ICC. In 1946
the American Trucking Association stated
that "The Commission's interpretations of
its authority disclose a definite pattern of
favoring the railroads to the detriment of
other types of carriers." In 1948 the man-
aging director of the ATA labeled the
Commission "railroad minded." In 1951
the ATA again expressed concern over the
Commission's railroad partiality and
recommended:
"a reorganization of the ICC un-
der which separate Commissions
would be established to regulate
rail, water, and motor carriers,
and freight forwarders, with an
appellate commission having jur-
diction over controversies in-
volving two or more classes of
carriers."
This year the newly-formed Trucking
Industry National Defense Committee in-
stituted a new drive to free the motor
carriers from ICC control. fembers told
President Eisenhower that the ICC was
"dominated" by the railroads and that the
bulk of its personnel were "railroad-
minded." They pointed out that the ship
lines and air lines were regulated by sepa-
rate commissions and urged that a Federal
Motor Transport Commission be created
to take over motor carrier regulation
from the ICC. [91 Traffic World 14, Feb.
1953].
What is true of the motor carriers is
also true of the other non-railroad interests
surrounding the Commission. Dr. Morgan
did not even deny that the water car-
riers are basically opposed to the Com-
mission. Instead he expressed the hope
that the water carriers will in the
future come to a "wider realization of
the value and need of regulation by
the Commission." The airlines are not,
of course, regulated by the Commission,
but the railroads have been active in at-
tempting to expand the ICC's powers into
this area. This has met the united resist-
ance of the air carrier industry.
DR. MORGAN:
The answer which Prof. Huntington's
type of analysis requires is suggested by
his, definition of "viability." It is a simple
factual one: Do motor carriers wish to
reduce the Commission's appropriations,
curtail its powers to an important extent,
or transfer its functions to another agency?
The answer is that no serious effort to re-
duce the Commissioi's authority or any
efforts to reduce its appropriation have
been made. [91 Traffic World 37, Apr. 25,
1953]. Motor carriers, favored with intelli-
gent leadership, alert to their own interests;
and knowing the Commission's work,
realize that their problems must be dealt
with in a common forum %%ith other modes
of transportation and that they cannot ex-
pect to win all their cases. Attention
should be called to the fact that Trucking
National Defense Committee has been
sponsored by tie head of the leading labor
organization in the trucking field, with the
collaboration of a leading manufacturer
of truck trailers and one large motor car-
rier. This Committee has nut spoken for
the motor carrier industry and, until it
gets the industry behind it, it will carry
little weight in behalf of Prof. Hunting-
ton's argument.
Some coastvise and intercoastal vmter
carriers have been critical of the Com-
mission because it has not given them a
desired degree of relief from harsh post-
war conditions, though by now most of
such carriers must realize ite statutory
limitations imposed on tie Commission.
Particular decisions may be objected to
by water carriers in these or other areas.
There is no move, however, to revoke
present regulation. Water carriers defi-
nitely would protest and, it may be added,
Congress would be most unlikely to find
merit in a proposal reversing an established
policy or divorcing such regulation from
that of other agencies.
It is true that the air lines do not wish
to be put under the Commission's jurisdic-
tion. The Commission, in this writer's
view, is not asking for jurisdiction in this
field. The "united resistance" of the air-
lines has disappeared. A vice-president of
a large line recently advocated placing air
carriers under the Commission.
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SUBPROPOSITION B2. Other government'agencies concerned with Commission action have
become alienated from the Commission.
PROF. HUNTINGTON:
The Marasinus suggested that one use-
ful index of agency viability was the pat-
tern of court action in sustaining or in-
validating agency decisions. An agency
which is able to make its orders stick and
secure judicial approval is obviously in a
better position than one whose orders are
periodically overruled by the judiciary.
Cases listed in the Commission's annual
reports revealed that since the 1930's there
has been a steady decrease in the propor-
tion of cases in which the Supreme Court
sustained the Commission. This proportion
was found to be 93 percent between 1936
and 1940, 82 percent from 1941 through
1945, and 74 percent from 1946 through
1950.
DR. MORGAN:
On Prof. Huntington's own basis of
testing "viability," the Commission's record
of legal victories was 89 and 81 percent
of the decisions summarized in the Com-
mission's last two annual reports. In the
term which began in October 1952, the
Commission won all nineteen three-judge
cases, only three of which were reported in
the annual report. Although gratifying,
these figures do not establish that the
Commission is on a new high plateau of
performance. No agency could expect to
win substantially all of its cases, and either
reversals or affirmations may be bunched
in a given period.
SUBPROPOSITION B3. Congress is becoming increasingly alienated from the Commission.
PROF. HUNTINGTON:
As Dr. Morgan correctly noted, "a
basic test of 'viability' is to be found in the
attitude of Congress toward the Commis-
sion." The clearest manifestation of con-
gressional attitude towards any agency is
congressional action on appropriations for
that agency. Congress has exhibited a
complete lack of sympathy for the Com-
mission in this respect. Congress has con-
sistently cut the ICC's budget far below
the sums approved by the Budget Bureau,
much less the original requests made by
the Commission itself. The net appropria-
tions of the Commission available for gen-
eral expenses other than salary increases
and overtime pay decreased from $7,867,-
000 in fiscal 1940 to $6,580,642 in fiscal
1953. During the same period the average
employment dropped from 2,439.9 in 1940
to an estimated 1,634.0 in 1953. In its re-
port for 1952 the Commission stated that it
was suffering from
"(1) serious delays in production
of work; (2) casual and super-
ficial consideration of many im-
portant matters, which results in
a growing number of complaints
that formal proceedings, records,
tariff publications, carriers' rec-
ords, transportation problems, and
DR. MORGAN:
To prove that inadequate Commission
funds indicate loss of "viability" in Con-
gress, Prof. Huntington must be able to
show that the inadequacy reflects the direct
use of the "power of the purse" to bring
the Commission into line. Most of the
Commission's financial difficulties can be
traced to the government's general econ-
omy drive in process for several years. The
Commission is only one of the regulatory
or kindred agencies which have complained
about appropriations inadequate for the
work load imposed. The economy drive
reached a climax in the consideration of
the appropriations for fiscal 1954. The ICC
received a small increase ($280,500) over
1953, but 25 percent more than what it re-
ceived in 1946. There were kindred agen-
cies which did not fare so well. The CAB
and SEC received less for 1954 than 1953;
the FTC the same amount. The Commis-
sion therefore was not singled out for harsh
treatment. For the years 1946-1954, com-
paring the ICC to five other regulatory
agencies (FCC, FTC, FPC, SEC and
CAB), the following statistics are signifi-
cant: The ICC's initial appropriation was
closest to the President's budget estimate
in two of the nine years and was farthest
from it in only one year. The ICC's initial
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many other matters are not ade-
quately analyzed or reviewed;
and (3) inability to recruit new
employees to be trained in order
to fill positions to be vacated by
experienced employees." [61 ICC
Axx. REP. 143-4 (1952)].
In general, the congressional attitude
towards the ICC appears to be best summed
up by the late Senator Tobey, who
recently described the Commission as be-
ing "railroad minded" and in need of an
"injection of hormones." [91 Traffic
World 21, Apr. 4, 1953].
Dr . sinGAN:
appropriation fell below the budget estim-
ate ky a maximum of 10 percent; for the
other agencies the maximum range was
from 10 to 2b percent. For the years 1946-
1952, comparing the same six agencies: The
ICC and one other agency received final ap-
propriations which exceeded the budget
estimate in four years; the other four
agencies had such an excess in only two
or three years. In no year was the ICC's
final appropriation, when compared to the
budget estimate, the lowest among the six
agencies.
SuBpRoposrrio B4. The Conmission is administratively ineffective and inefficient, suf-
fers from undue passivity, and is losing transportation leadership to other agencies.
PROF. HUNTINGTON:
The recently released Volf manage-
ment survey, made under the auspices of
the Senate Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce Committee, substantiates the ad-
ministrative marasmus of the Commission:
"When authority and responi-
bility for the performance of ad-
ministrative duties and opera-
tions are divided among coequal
executives, experience has shown
that inefficiency, economic waste,
delays in procedures, poor co-
ordination, and lack of administra-
tive programs are the results.
"Our survey of the organiza-
tional structure and operations of
the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission confirms the disadvant-
ages inherent in its present mul-
tiple-executive type management.
"The present number of 15 bur-
eaus, some organized according
to specific functions, others ac-
cording to types of carriers,
presents obstacles to efficient
administration. Related activi-
ties are not grouped together,
which has lead to duplication and
overlapping of functions and a
lack of coordination of the activi-
ties of the bureaus.
DR. MORGAN:
The Wolf organization made a brief
survey and offered certain recommenda-
tions. The Commission has accepted these
recommendations "in principle" and now is
engaged in considering which of them re-
quire implementation. These recommen-
dations consist e.sentially of introducing
both more line organization and more
functional organization. For ten years the
Commission has carried forward function-
alization of its work. The Wolf report in
this respect would merely continue this
trend.
Prof. Huntington relies on the existence
of special investigatory bodies to prove the
inadequacy and reluctance of the Commis-
sion in transportation planning. Part of
the legislative work of the Federal Co-
ordinator of Transportation undoubtedly
could have been, and some of it would have
been, carried out by the Commission if this
special agency had not been set up. The
Commission had made two nationwide in-
vestigations of the need for federal motor
carrier regulation and had made recom-
mendations to and appeared before Con-
gress on this subject; the Coordinator's
work in this respect was a follow-up. The
Commission noted that it had no authority
to investigate the question of need for more
extensive regulation of water carriers. The
Coordinator's studies of terminal unifica-
tions might not have strained the Commis-
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"When services and functions
are not well coordinated, when
staffs are not well informed on
policies and over-all programs,
experience has shown that there
usually develops a sluggishness
and awkwardness in the work
process. The present operations
within the Commission are no ex-
ception ... "
The Wolf report pointed out that of
the 1,019 employees of the Commission
rated as GS 7 or over, 65.3 percent were at
least fifty years old. Two hundred eighty
key persons were found to be 60 years old
or older, and 93.2 percent of these were
eligible to retire. The Commission's man-
power situation, the report declared, is
"serious and requires early action." The
survey authors further stated that:
"This situation is aggravated
by a Personnel Office with inade-
quate personnel programs.
"Unless the Personnel Office is
able to initiate and effectively car-
ry out much needed personnel pro-
grams, there is little likelihood
that the quality of supervision will
improve or that the Commission
can successfully delegate addition-
al responsibility and authority to
its staff."
On the issue of Commission passivity
and lack of initiative, particularly in con-
nection with program development, Dr.
Morgan argued that the Commission is
severely limited by its statutory mandate.
Actually, this is not the case: The Trans-
portation Act of 1940 makes the Commis-
sion responsible for administering and en-
forcing the Interstate Commerce Act in
such a manner as to achieve the broad ob-
jectives which Congress has defined in the
National Transportation Policy. This re-
sponsibility is one which Congress has as-
signed to the Commission alone and the
Act obviously permits the Commission to
take the initiative in meeting national
transportation problems. Yet the Commis-
sion has consistently failed to discharge
this responsibility and consequently it has
had to be assumed by other agencies.
It is, thus, only because the ICC chooses
to interpret its powers in such a narrow
DR. MORGAN:
sion's powers unduly, but a change in the
law similar to that provided in the Emerg-
ency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933
(setting aside the antitrust laws) would
have been necessary for it to have done
comparable work. The Coordinator's
studies of means of effecting improvement
and reduction of waste in rail freight atd
passenger service and operations could
have been made by the Commission, with
the aid of outside specialists. On the other
hand, it would have been beyond its powers,
inappropriate, and fatal from the view-
point of "viability" for the Commission to
have made a study comparable with the
Coordinator's treatment of public aids,
Government ownership, comparative labor
standards, and other labor matters in rail,
motor, and other forms of transportation.
This analysis of the Federal Coordinator of
Transportation generally applies to the
1940 Board of Investigation and Research,
whose record was not impressive. The fact
that the Committee of Three for Immedi-
ate Relief for the Railroads was set up by
the President caused its recommendations,
of a kind which could have been made in
the ICC's Annual Report, to be of greater
interest than ordinarily. And the Commit-
tee of Six covered work which in part was
foreign to the Commission's field. As Prof.
Huntington makes much of the National
Transportation Policy (which he construes
too broadly), it should be noted that three
of the special organizations mentioned
above were created before 1940 and one
was created at the time the Policy was
enacted in 1940.
On the positive side, the Commission
has exerted an immense amount of leader-
ship and initiative in the years in which It
is supposed to have fallen ill of "maras-
mus." For example: a substantially com-
plete national uniformity of class rates and
a national freight classification; the Com-
mission's far-reaching and violently at-
tacked decision to do away with undesir-
able leasing practices in motor transporta-
tion; its work in bringing about a reduction
of railroad funded debt and fixed charges
through reorganizations and otherwise and
in requiring competitive bidding in the sale
of railroad securities; its vital contribu-
tions to the national defense and to rail
and motor safety; its development of
cost and waybill analyses; its handling of
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and negative fashion that it is unable to
act effectively in transportation policy de-
velopment. This Commission negativism
is in itself, of course, an indication of the
low viability of the Commission. An
agency with high viability is always alert
to new needs and to the opportunities to
develop and extend its responsibilities.
Dr, Mt.%AN:
the very controversial and important ques-
tion of adequate compensation for rail car-
riage of the mail; its many legislative
recommendations and its appearances b2-
fore congressional cummittecs to defend its
recommendations and to oppose what it
deemed undesirable legislation, such as the
"quick-increase" bill and the modification
of Section 15(1) proposed by the rail-
roads; and its frank discussion in its an-
nual repurts of many important and timely
problems. This partial list, when viewed
against the Commission's daily workload.
is an impressive indication that the Com-
mission has continued to show "alertness
to new needs" and willingness and ability,
within the limits of obtainable funds, to
grapple with problems, including some in-
volving matters over which the Commis-
sion has no jurisdiction but which affect
its work.
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